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The organization that is discussed here- - the NAFTA Secretariat- -
has some unusual characteristics.  It comprises three national sections, one
each for Canada, the United States and Mexico, with each section headed
by a Secretary.  I am Secretary of the Canadian section. In organizational
terms, the sections are “mirror images” of one another. The three Secretar-
ies report to the Free Trade Commission, which itself consists of the three
Ministers responsible for international trade in their respective countries.
The three Secretaries must always reach a consensus on any problem re-
quiring resolution, since none of the Secretaries has authority over the
others.  We have to work together to implement the terms and conditions
of the Agreement on the matters with which we are concerned.
One important aspect of our organization is that the Secretariat’s
three national sections operate independently of their respective govern-
ments, i.e., we have an arm’s-length relationship, and this independence
ensures the integrity and impartiality of the process. In a few words, our
mandate consists in administering the trade dispute settlement procedures
that were negotiated by the three member countries. In short our role is to:221
• register complaints;
• receive and redistribute all relevant documents;
• organize the hearing(s); and
• issue decisions.
DISPUTE CASES
The Secretariat does not initiate cases on its own.  It is important to
understand this point because some of you may wish we would do that.  I
will explain later exactly how cases are initiated.  This will be useful be-
cause speakers appearing in a previous workshop have sent a somewhat
inaccurate message about how exactly the process begins and unfolds.
The paper in question was presented by Burfisher, Norman and Schwartz
(2001) which said some flattering things about the role of the Secretariat,
but they were not entirely correct.
Let’s be clear about a second thing: the dispute settlement mecha-
nisms of the NAFTA are not informal processes.  Everything is codified in
Rules of procedure that deal with the most minute details.  It is not my
intention today to criticize the system when I say that Rules are strict, but
simply to drive home the point that this system is precisely codified.  Rules
do not bend.  There are rules for disputes between private industries
(NAFTA,  Chapter 19) and there are other rules for disputes between gov-
ernments (NAFTA, Chapter 20).  In the latter case, rules allow for “consul-
tations,” as Burfisher, Norman and Schwartz have written (2001, p.133).
In fact, this is the norm, but consultations occur in very formal settings, as
a country must first officially request them, and there are no guarantees,
other than goodwill, that they will occur anytime soon after the request is
made. For Chapter 19, Burfisher, Norman and Schwartz use the expres-
sion  “parties can inform interested parties” to describe the hard reality of
the initiation of an antidumping complaint by a competitor1 (“complaint”
by a competitor is highlighted to distinguish it from “parties can inform”).
The two situations are quite different from one another.  In Canada, the
complaint will be made before the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency.
____________________
1   A competitor must control 25 percent of the regional or national market.
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The authors continue their argument with the expression “and provide
them (ie., the parties) with the opportunity to furnish information,” when
in fact, the importer receives a lengthy questionnaire about its business
practices to be filled before a set date, or else … What is called a “normal
value” (which in fact is the maximum value) will be assessed against that
importer, as a duty.  That is not really a benign “opportunity to furnish
information,” as they wrote.
Also, parties may request “panel reviews”. This means in real life,
that if the Agency did not come up with the required trade remedy, the
dissatisfied company or industry group must (not “may”) request a panel,
to review the decision.  It is the economic and social responsibility of that
company to use all means at its reach to protect its interests and that of its
labour force.  Let us not forget that real people bear the brunt of any un-
pleasant trade dispute.  That is the rationale for these dispute resolution
mechanisms.
HOW THE APPEAL PROCESS WORKS
The terms and conditions negotiated between Canada, the United
States and Mexico to resolve trade disputes within the Secretariat are very
strict, as in any appeal process.  They provide an opportunity for the
continent’s business firms to appeal a decision by a national tribunal to a
supranational authority (in other words, the Secretariat), strictly with re-
gard to dumping and subsidies.
For Canada, the decisions that can be reviewed on appeal are those
by the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency or the Canadian Interna-
tional Trade Tribunal.  In Secretariat jargon, these two entities (and only
these two) are “the investigating authorities whose decisions can be sub-
ject to review by a special binational panel”. The procedure is as follows:
the Customs Agency will have decided to impose a customs duty (techni-
cally called an “anti-dumping duty”), whose effect, as you well know, is to
increase the prices of the goods in question on the Canadian market (or on
the U.S. or Mexican market, depending on where the decision was made)
and consequently, protecting the national producer from competition.  In223
Canada, it will have determined that the American or Mexican producer is
selling its products, by itself or to an importer, for less than it costs to
produce them domestically, and is therefore guilty of dumping, or alterna-
tively that it is receiving a subsidy enabling it to sell its products at a lower
price in Canada, that is the “countervailing duty.”  When an alleged sub-
sidy is involved, governments will be participants to a Chapter 19 case.  As
we saw this fall in the case of softwood lumber, these two tariffs can be
applied cumulatively.
A third cause of complaint has also appeared in the books of the
Customs Agency or its equivalent in the United States or Mexico, i.e,  “price
discrimination.”  As a matter of fact, an offence will be suspected if the
advertised price of a product in Canada is less than its advertised price in
the United States or Mexico.
The essence of a trade dispute rests on the calculation of the sub-
sidy proportion affecting the price of a good for the purposes of calculat-
ing the customs duty.  The same applies to the factors included in the
production cost calculation of a firm accused of dumping.  What in fact are
the costs, down to the last red cent? That is what the Customs Agency
decides and the way, or how, it arrived at its determination, is what can be
appealed before the Secretariat. For a case to go forward, a competing
business in another country must also have been harmed -- the injury test,
as it was very briefly mentioned by Burfisher, Norman and Schwartz (2001,
p. 137).  If no harm has been caused, there is no case.  The Canadian
International Trade Tribunal is responsible, in Canada, for finding whether
one or more firms representing a significant proportion of national pro-
duction have been affected by dumping.  These two institutions therefore
work on the same cases at different stages of the procedure.
Decisions concerning dumping, subsidies and injury, by the Canada
Customs and Revenue Agency and the Canadian International Trade Tri-
bunal, as well as those issued by the equivalent agencies in the United
States and Mexico, can also be appealed to the Federal Court of Canada, to
the United States Court of International Trade and, in Mexico, to the Tribu-
nal Fiscal de la Federación. The point is that the dispute settlement proce-
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dures allow one or more firms, through our Secretariat, to challenge an
administrative decision in a forum other than one of the national courts I
have just named. There is not much room for informality in this.
To summarize, I would say that as a general rule foreign firms are
interested in challenging, before the Secretariat’s Canadian Section, the
imposition of a customs duty, and Canadian firms are interested in chal-
lenging the roll back of a customs duty.  Reading Burfisher’ Norman and
Schwartz, one could have thought that only foreign firms could appeal a
decision made in Canada.  This is not the case.  In fact, when a customs
duty is rolled back as a result of a periodic administrative review (normally
every five years), all players are once again subject to the rules of the
market and this may not suit a group of firms previously protected in Canada
by a customs duty.
Finally, under the NAFTA rules, the panel’s mandate is to consider
only whether the laws of the country being challenged, have been strictly
observed in the first place.  It is not open to a panel to determine whether,
in light of the case participants’ explanations before it the law has, as it
were, some far-sighted provision that permits a novel interpretation.  The
panel cannot judge the case again.  Of course, if an issue is remanded to
the responsible authority by the panel, the decision will probably be
amended; however, this will be because of an error in construing the law
and for no other reason.
CHAPTER 19 CASES
We now to elaborate further on the efficient and timely role that the
NAFTA Secretariat plays in the administration of the dispute resolution
process, and demonstrate that the provisions offered in Chapter 19 of the
NAFTA, are an attractive alternative to judicial courts because they are far
less expensive and not as lengthy.  The Agreement was written in a way
that allows companies or industries to have the option between a national
tribunal and the NAFTA Secretariat, giving precedence to the NAFTA pro-
cess.225
For instance, a company that intends to initiate an appeal of a final
determination before a judicial court, must file within 20 days of the pub-
lication of the official note announcing this final determination.  This is
called a “Notice of Intent to Commence Judicial Review.”  It advises the
Secretariat, as well as the importers and exporters of the product in ques-
tion, of the company’s desire to have a federal tribunal review the matter.
Another company who would prefer to go before a NAFTA panel has 30
days to file a Request for Panel Review.  These extra 10 days are the proof
that the three governments have clearly intended to give precedence to the
panel system.
It has happened on a few occasions after a company’s Request for
Judicial Review, that another company satisfied with the decision of the
Agency, filed a Request for Panel Review with the Secretariat simply to
prevent a judicial review.  We can assume that the reasons for this were to
have a panel of experts review the matter and also to avoid lengthy delays.
I say, “we can assume” because there is only anecdotal evidence of the
motivations of those companies that prefer our process to that of judicial
courts.
The NAFTA Secretariat’s work is to ensure that the Rules are ad-
hered to and that, to the extent possible, the prescribed time periods are
respected, by both the participants and the panelists.
Now consider the time line these Rules prescribe.  The provisions
with respect to panel reviews conducted pursuant to Article 1904 are de-
signed to result in decisions of the panels within 315 days after the com-
mencement of the panel review. The Secretariat, on receipt of a Request
for Panel Review and without any undue delays, assigns a case number to
the file, notifies both involved Ministers, the investigating authority and
the service list, which is comprised of importers and exporters of the goods
that have been subjected to the investigation.  The Secretary also publishes
the Notice in question in the official gazette of her or his country.  And the
computation of time begins.
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Persons on the service list are then allowed 30 days from the Re-
quest date to file Complaints, and 15 more days to file Notices of Appear-
ance.  These Notices can be filed either in support or against the com-
plaint.  The process becomes really animated, when you find out that a
company fights both the complaint and the investigating authority, the first
for asking too much, and the second, for not going far enough. On the
55th day following commencement, panelists are named.  Upon receiving
the names of the panel members, the Secretariat ensures that a conference
call is held in the following days with the intent of scheduling the hearing
as closely as possible to the time period prescribed in the Rules.
It is not often that the list of panel members is completed in time
but that does not, in any way, prevent the process from continuing and
participants from filing their respective briefs within the prescribed time
period.  Further, once appointed, the Panel shall take into account the in-
tent of the Rules to secure just, speedy and inexpensive reviews of final
determinations when considering any delays or extensions of time.
Panelists or not, 15 days after the filing of Notices of Appearance
(we are then at day 60), the investigating authority files the administrative
record comprised of all documents or other information presented to or
obtained by the competent agency in the course of the administrative pro-
ceeding.  The Secretariat receives anywhere between two and twenty boxes
of documents which are copied and distributed to the five panelists.  This
leads to the filing of briefs by complainants and respondents at intervals of
60 days.  Complainants’ reply briefs are due 15 days after that (we are then
at day 195).  Oral arguments are normally heard 30 days after the filing of
reply briefs depending on the availability of the five members.  No later
than 90 days after the oral arguments, the panel renders its decision and
the Secretariat is responsible for the issuance and translation of it.
The panel decision coincides with the 315 days prescribed by the
Rules.  Of course, the panel may remand, i.e. send back the issue(s) to the
investigating authority.  But then, the complainant has won its case in terms
of getting the responsible agency to modify its decision and perhaps, the
company will obtain everything it pleaded for.227
Then, there is a possibility that a “new,” if I may say, unsatisfied
customer, will object to the new decision of the Agency, and the process
will be prolonged.  This “customer” is never a government, it can only be
one of the original participant to the case who files what is called “a Writ-
ten Submission with respect to the Determination on Remand,” commonly
known as a “Challenge to the Determination on Remand.”  The panel will
only consider the Agency’s remand if such a document is filed. There is no
situation where a panel will revise its decision only after informal com-
ments by participants.
Throughout that process, the Secretariat is responsible for admin-
istrative support, protection of confidential and proprietary information,
timely service and distribution of documents, arrangements for the hear-
ing (including pre and post-hearing meetings).  Its effectiveness in per-
forming all of these tasks is essential to making this dispute resolution
mechanism a less costly one for interested parties.  One can only imagine
the impacts and delays associated to a breach of confidentiality or over-
sight in service of documents.  A worthy anecdote on that subject was
reported by William P. Alford (now a U.S. panelist) in 1987, when he men-
tioned a case that was remanded by the Court of Appeals for the Federal
District to the Court of International Trade  “to dismiss … for lack of juris-
diction” because [the complainant] complaint initially lacked adequate
postage and reached the CIT approximately two weeks later than is per-
mitted by the CIT’s Rules.”2  Alford, with humour, concluded the episode
in old English, writing “Woe unto ye who think deadlines are mere for-
malities!”
In Canada, 47 experts can be called upon to reach a decision in a
dispute.  To be included on this roster, a person must of course be familiar
with international trade law, either as a lawyer, or as a professor of law or
political science.  The professional and personal reputations of these indi-
viduals are already established and respected in business circles.  To be
____________________
2  Alford, William P., “When is China Paraguay?  An examination of the application of
the antidumping and countervailing duty laws of the United States to China and
other ‘nonmarket economy’ nations.”  Southern California Law Review. 61: 79-135,
1987, p. 82.
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selected as a panelist, the jurist must then agree to comply with the Code of
Conduct developed in the Rules of Procedure; this Code is essential if the
procedure is to have any credibility.  Any financial interest, business rela-
tionship or personal situation likely to influence the jurist’s independence
or impartiality, or that could be so perceived, must be declared in writing
as soon as it occurs during a proceeding.
In addition, the arbitrators are selected to hear a dispute on a case-
by-case basis and they are not accountable for their decisions to the gov-
ernments that selected them but, human nature being what it is, to their
profession and ultimately, to their colleagues.  If I were one of them, I
would always bear in mind that my decision may be cited later and this
would be a definite source of pride for me. Arbitrators also are mindful of
the Extraordinary Challenge Committees, a special procedure provided in
the rules for the purpose of setting aside a panel decision because of gross
misconduct on the part of one or several members of the panel. The mere
fact that this procedure could be invoked ensures that rules are closely
followed.
It is important to note in this context that in just 12 years, the 90
decisions heard under the rules of Chapter 19, which relates to dumping
and subsidies, have resulted only once in a decision where the panelists
lined up on the side of the industry of their respective nations.  Accord-
ingly, our panelists have made a great contribution to more harmonious
trade relations between the North American Free Trade Agreement mem-
ber countries, by confirming the power of the rule of law in these relations.
OTHER DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES
I would like to end this presentation by describing the other major
aspect of the dispute settlement procedures provided in NAFTA. The three
countries have given themselves, through a procedure separate from the
one relating to industry groups or companies, the possibility of using arbi-
trators to resolve a dispute concerning the interpretation of the NAFTA by
the signatory governments.  For example, is a specific country entitled to229
make a new research assistance program available to local firms without
infringing the spirit, and above all the letter, of the Agreement?
This separate procedure is found in Chapter 20.  When a dispute
arises, the governments can decide to use this procedure, or take the issue
to the World Trade Organization, either, but not both fora.  The Chapter 20
process is of a nature to promote informality in the ways of settling a dis-
pute, much like Burfisher, Norman and Schwartz described. The involved
countries begin by undertaking a consultation process among officials.  If
this fails, one of the countries will request a special meeting of the Free
Trade Commission, which (again), consists of the three ministers respon-
sible for international trade. They may decide to ask technical experts to
review the facts, or recommend mediation by a specialized organization or
special envoys.  A five-member panel will be established only as a last
resort.
If a panel is established, the selection process is not the same as the
one under Chapter 19. Each country selects two members from the other
country. The panel chair is selected by the Parties involved and can be a
citizen of any country in the world, whereas under Chapter 19 the chair is
identified by consensus among the panelists (it is my job to promote this
consensus during an initial conference call).
The governments then file submissions and rebuttals and at least
one hearing will be called by the responsible Secretariat in the country
whose program or legislative measure is being challenged.  The panel’s
initial report, which is expected 90 days (three months) after the last panel-
ist is selected, will contain recommendations (as opposed to a binding de-
cision under Chapter 19’s Rules) for a possible solution of the dispute.
Each country then makes a submission regarding the suggestions made to
them and the panel prepares a final report within the next 30 days.
The only delays allowed in this time schedule (and don’t forget the
NAFTA’s basic goal, which is to reduce the length and cost of any dispute)
are to enable a panel to grant a request by a country for the establishment
of a scientific review board to hear experts on environmental, health, safety
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or other scientific matters; it is up to the panel to decide whether this is
relevant in the case before them.
Certain restrictions on release of information are also strictly speci-
fied in the Rules. Their only purpose is to maintain the integrity of the
dispute settlement procedure, so that the Parties can resolve their dispute
informally at any time without a panel intervening. It is not generally known
that since Mexico joined the Agreement, of the 23 instances brought to the
attention of the Secretariat by governments concerning another govern-
ment, only four have resulted in formal requests for review by a panel.  In
other words, 19 cases have been resolved before their conclusion through
consultations between the Parties.
In my work and in that of all three National Sections’ staff, we act
as if the credibility of the Agreement itself is at stake on a daily basis
because beyond the individual disputes, trade agreements are under close
scrutiny in public opinion of recent years.  Ours should be nurtured closely.
For instance, we always keep in mind that today, when a business is forced
to pay customs duties it did not pay before, the first victims are very often
the workers employed by the firm and its suppliers, if the importing busi-
ness is not in a position to pass on the customs duties to its customers
through an equivalent increase in its prices.  A significant proportion of the
employees are then hit by technical unemployment, as an economist would
say, which is the same, in the street, as real unemployment.
Therefore, the well being of their families or, as the United States
Constitution promises, their “Pursuit of happiness,” depend on the rapid
resolution of trade disputes.  In fact, there is a real world behind each case
and we are all aware at the Secretariat, that the sooner a dispute is resolved,
the more the NAFTA will meet public expectations.
CONCLUSION
My last word will be very short. The major trend emerging from
the last twelve years of dispute resolution practice in NAFTA is that this
part of the Agreement is a success that is used as a model globally when231
countries liberalize their mutual trade.  Negotiators have come to realize
that resolving disputes is critical to the success of free trade agreements,
both in general and in particular.  And dispute avoidance is an even better
approach.  As I have described above, the NAFTA dispute settlement mecha-
nisms incorporate both provisions, but in separate chapters.
And if your company has a complaint against a competitor, do not
forget to mail it to the appropriate agency with enough postage on the
envelope!
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